



In what follows I come up with a definition of "an action" that
is the core of one account of the concept of action. The account will
not be unfamiliar; it is presented here as an alternative to that
which Michael Moore presents in Act and Crime.' I shall show that
Moore can accept my proposed definition, which indeed fits neatly
with some of the pieces of his own account, and that he has nothing
to lose from endorsing my account, which is capable of doing all the
work that he asks of his own. In a sense, then, my project is
conciliatory. I do not expect to win Moore's immediate agreement,
however, because his account incorporates a number of claims that
my alternative shuns. I shall argue that these additional claims of
Moore are the products of a pervasive confusion, and of a spurious
reductionism.
I proceed by tracing a rapid and rather devious path through Act
and Crime, looking at ten topics in turn. My intention is to steer
such a course that the definition of "an action" that I favor emerges
from points that Moore and I agree about, and such a course that
areas left dark by Moore become illuminated in the setting of the
familiar account. In an Appendix, I respond to the criticisms that
Moore makes of my own position in the philosophy of action.
I. BASICNESS
The thesis of chapter 11 of Moore's book, announced in its
chapter title, is "the identity of complex actions with basic acts."
2
This is puzzling. Assuming, as Moore does, that what is basic is not
complex, it is very obvious that no complex action is the same as
any basic one. The identities actually defended in chapter 11 are
those approved by proponents of the so-called coarse-grained
account of actions' individuation.' Moore rightly puts me on the
t Professor of Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, Oxford University.
1 MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw (1993).
2 Id. at 280.
- Here and throughout, "action" denotes particulars-specifically those particulars
whose individuation has been in dispute under the rubric of "action individuation."
(1719)
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list:4 like Moore, I think that when Smith kills Jones by moving his
finger against the trigger, for instance, the action that is Smith's
moving of his finger against the trigger is the same as that which is
Smith's killing of Jones. But I could not think this if I wanted to
say, as Moore does, that Smith's killing ofJones is a complex action,
while Smith's moving of his finger is a basic one.
Moore had plans to avoid the inconsistencies that his claims of
identity bring. A footnote early on in Moore's book states that "in
Ch[apter] 11 ... [t]he basic/complex distinction ... becomes a
distinction between two sort [sic] of description of acts, not between
two sorts of action."5 This statement does not take away the puzzle,
however. When Moore introduces the distinction, he is very
insistent that it is a distinction among actions;6 if it really were to
undergo a change, we should expect to be aware of this when it
happens; yet we read in vain to discover the transmutation. 7 In any
case, the announced change in the distinction is not all that is
needed to remove Moore's inconsistencies. However the term
"basic" works, it cannot straightforwardly apply to any item that
"complex" also applies to, given that no basic item is a complex one;
it makes no difference to this point what sort of items are meant to
be basic.
I think that Moore's footnote is symptomatic of difficulties one
is bound to meet if one tries to adhere to treating a basic/nonbasic
distinction as a distinction among actions. It is not that Moore's
distinction is required somehow to turn into a different one, but
that "basic" should not have been supposed to apply to particulars
(to events, to actions) in the first place. Moore ought never to have
arrived in a position from which it follows that m which is basic is
See id. at 280-92. My use of "action" is different from that typically employed in
everyday English for either of "act" or of "action." Nonetheless "action" strikes me
(perhaps in consequence of the part it has played in the philosophical literature) as
the better candidate to mean something which we do well to find a single word for.
In Act and Crime, Moore uses both "action" and "act" frequently, and apparently
quite unsystematically. His use of"act" both for particulars and for things of a quite
different sort fuels the confusion I expose below. See discussion infra notes 10-13 and
accompanying text.
4 See id. at 280 n.1 (listing "course-grained" theorists).
s Id. at 79 n.5.
6 See, e.g., id. at 81 ("There is no type of act that is basic; only particular acts.").
If the distinction does change, it is not in chapter 11 that it does so since basic
descriptions were introduced earlier. See id. at 169 (noting that a "basic description...
ascribes only the property of bodily-movement-caused-by-a-volition").
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the same as k which is not basic.
To appreciate what Moore's distinction really is, it is best to set
aside the technical "act-types" and the formal "descriptions," in
order to be able to say in ordinary terms what basicness is about.
Thus, the thought that we "simply" raise our arms' or that we raise
our arms "just like that" captures the idea that there is nothing else
we do by doing which we raise our arms:9 raising one's arm is
usually basic, because it is something one usually does not do by
doing something else. "Being basic" then appears to be a property
of things we do.
0
Moore takes "being basic" to be a property of actions because
he confuses these with things we do: he confuses what he calls
particular acts with what he calls types of act. He speaks of acts
(where I have spoken of things we do), and he assumes that a
' This "simply" is presumably what induces Moore to use "complex" for the
nonbasic side of the basic/nonbasic distinction. The terminology is undesirable
(apart from its unfamiliarity) for two reasons: (1) it carries a suggestion that
"complex" things have parts that basic things do not, which is not the case (not even
on Moore's view); and (2) it distracts us from the fact that "basic" behaves as a sort
of superlative, best understood in terms of a relation "more basic than." See e.g., id.
at 102 (arguing that at a certain point "there is no simpler or more basic action" by
which a movement is performed); see also discussion infra app.
' I use "in order to" and "by" indifferently here, because I am not concerned with
the details but am trying only to convey the basic idea. Different conceptions of
basicness can be distinguished; the difference between "in order to" and "by" can play
some part in distinguishing a teleological from a purely causal one. In fact,
"intentionally" is needed for the intuitive teleological notion. See discussion infra app.
0 Things we do correspond one-to-one with descriptions of actions (at least if it
is allowed that acts can be typed as finely as descriptions of actions can be
distinguished).
I think of the phrases we use to speak of things we do as infinitival. Here's a route
to thinking of them this way. First consider a certain use of the standard infinitive:
"What she did was to raise her arm." Then notice that the "to" can be lost: "Raise
her arm was what she did." Then realize that a difference of aspect can be recorded
without any fundamental change: "Raising her arm was what she was doing," and
"Raising her arm was what she did." Occurrence of the "-ing" form, both in these
(last two quoted) sentences and in genuine action-denoting nominals (like "her raising
of her arm"), has helped to fuel the confusion of things done with actions. See supra
note 3, and infra notes 11-12: "[R]aising her arm" is wrongly supposed to be just
shorthand for "her raising of her arm."
The question of the interpretation of "what she did," and of phrases that specify
what someone did, is more complicated than this little account allows. For one thing,
the idea of relativization, which I introduce below to explain "basic," needs to be
deployed more widely.
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particular act is an item in a category of events." But calling
something that someone does "a particular act" cannot turn it into
an item that is a particular.12 The acts, or things, that people do
plainly are not particulars. Raising one's arm is one such thing; it
could hardly be a particular, being something that any number of
people can do, and something that anyone can do any number of
times. "Raising one's arm" does not denote any event. What occurs
at a time is someone's raising of her arm. A person's doing
something, not the thing she does, is the unrepeatable item 1-the
" For example, Moore says: "Raising my arm is usually a basic act I do." MOORE,
supra note 1, at 81. The "usually" makes it clear enough that "raising my arm" here
is not true of any particular (although I think myself that "raising my arm" never
applies to a particular in fact). Cf supra note 10. A couple of sentences later,
however, Moore takes it to be referring to a particular. See MOORE, supra note 1, at
81 ("There is no type of act that is basic; only particular acts. The identity claim is
thus that any particular basic act is identical to some bodily movement."). This isjust
a solitary example, taken from hundreds, of Moore's confusing usage.
12 By "item that is a particular" I mean, roughly, something in the category of
nonabstract entities, which are occupants of the spatiotemporal world. Items outside
this category can be particular (that is, certain) items in some category of non-
particulars.
Those who believe in tropes, as Goldman does, see Alvin I. Goldman, Action and
Crime: A Fine-Grained Approach, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1563, 1567-69, 1582 (1994), will
take the phrase "a particular arm raising" to refer to a trope, and they will dispute my
claim that particulars are not referred to by such phrases. It is a matter of
controversy whether good sense is to be made of tropes. (For some misgivings about
tropes, see Chris Daly, Tropes, 44 PROc. ARISTOTELAN Soc'' 253 (1994) (arguing that
trope theory has no advantages over the theory of universals).) What ought not to
be controversial, as Goldman's article makes abundantly clear, is that if there are
tropes, then a fine-grained account of their individuation is appropriate. My criticism
of Moore is directed against his assuming both that "particular acts" are events (for
which, we agree, a coarse-grained account of individuation is appropriate), and that
"particular acts" can be singled out as Moore singles them out (by writing "particular"
in front of the name of a universal).
"5 There is a notable absence from Moore's book of phrases that denote the
unrepeatable items, the particulars. In a way this absence is explicable: action-
denoting nominals occur very rarely in ordinary talk. Moore fails to appreciate this;
rather than write in the slightly extraordinary way that is necessary to make the
distinctions and achieve the precision that theoretical work demands, Moore writes
in a not strictly intelligible way-as if all sorts of other phrases, which actually have a
quite different semantic role, could do for him what these (rare) nominals do.
A further source of the confusion between items which are particulars and items
which are not is Moore's taking sentences to refer to actions. For instance, "'I moved
my finger yesterday' refers to a particular act of finger-moving that I did at a
particular time." MOORE, supra note 1, at 80. Here as elsewhere, Moore means an
action by "particular act of finger-moving." It is evidently compatible with the truth
of "I moved my finger yesterday" that there were in fact ten thousand events
yesterday (when I was typing) of each of which "my moving of my finger" is true.
Suppose I specify one of these ten thousand and call it Moo. Nothing could possibly
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event (the item of the sort about which questions about individua-
tion get asked).
In order to settle a question in a particular case about which of
the things then done was the basic one, it has to be known what was
actually done by doing what else in that case. So we have to
acknowledge that things done are not basic tout court.t4 This is why
one has to say that raising one's arm is usually basic. In the unusual
case in which someone raises her left arm by lifting it with her right
arm, there is something else she does by doing when she raises her
left arm, so that raising the left arm is not then the basic thing.
This shows a need to relativize the application of "basic" to
particular actions. But it does not show that actions are what
"basic" applies to. "Basic" applies, on any occasion (relative to the
action there was on that occasion), to that thing, among those that
the agent did then, which she did otherwise than by doing some-
thing else.15 And any thing to which "nonbasic" then applies is of
course a different thing that she did. (Or, using "act" for what is
done: any nonbasic act is different from the basic one.)
ensure that the sentence "I moved my finger yesterday" referred to Moo, or that it
referred to any of the other nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine candidate
events that I might have designated instead. And even if I had moved my finger only
once yesterday, the sentence could not refer to the event whose occurrence then made
it true. Reference is a rigid relation; but a sentence actually made true uniquely by
Moo might have been made true by a different action.
1 There is a notion of a basic capacity, of what someone basically can do. When
this is introduced, we may speak of things as basic for a person with a particular
repertoire of movements, now not relative to a particular action. An idea of what is
basic tout court might then be got out of the idea of what is basic for any nonincapaci-
tated grown-up human being.
5 When Moore suddenly applies "basic" to descriptions, see supra note 5 and
accompanying text, he speaks as if every bodily movement description were a basic
one despite his having said that raising the arm is usually basic. He has come to
neglect what I call the relativity of predications of "basicness." The point about
relativity is that one has to have particulars and things done simultaneously on the
scene if one is to understand basicness. Moore's failure to understand this can
explain his thinking that a distinction between actions "becomes" a distinction
between descriptions: first he hoped to understand it attaching to particulars in
isolation, then to descriptions in isolation.
In my treatment in Actions, seeJENNIFER HORNSBY, AcTIONS 70 (1980), to which
Moore refers, I had "more basic than" as a relation between <action, description>
pairs. In Actions and Abilities, seeJennifer Hornsby, Actions and Abilities, in LANGUAGE,
LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY 387, 388 (Rudolf Haller & Wolfgang Grassl eds., 1980), I
used <thing done, action> pairs (which, in its avoidance of the formal mode, may be
suited to capture various intuitive notions). Given that the same action recurs in each
pair that is ordered by the relation, a treatment of "more basic than" as a relation
between things done relative to an action now seems to me better.
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II. INDIVIDUATION
When it is understood how "basic" works, "basic" can be used
in asking questions about actions' individuation. The central
question at issue between proponents of so-called coarse-grained
and fine-grained accounts is whether a person who does two things,
where one is less basic than the other (so that she does the one by
doing the other), is thereby the agent of just one action. 6 If this
were a question about the things the person did, then the answer
would plainly be No: one thing a person did is not the same as
another thing she did. A proponent of the so-called coarse-grained
view does not advance Moore's absurd claim-that various different
things done by a person are identical-but the claim that where a
person does one by doing another, her doing the one is the same as
her doing the other.
Defenses of the fine-grained account have relied to a great
extent upon the confusion of the things we do with our actions.
17
What Moore's work demonstrates is that if one does not mind the
contradictions, then the confusion can be combined with the coarse-
grained account.
Of course Moore is not alone in making the confusion.'8 And
16 "Is thereby the agent of" is an example of the slightly extraordinary way we have
to speak if we are not to confuse what we do with our actions. Cf supra note 13 and
accompanying text. A person's relation to what she does is expressed by "do";
whereas her relation to her actions is expressed using a genitive. Taking an action-
denoting phrase to have the form "A's X-ing," the question whether "the person is
thereby the agent ofjust one action" is such a question (schematically) as whether
"A's X-ing is A's Y-ing." (Here and throughout, in notes and text, I use "X" and "Y"
as schematic letters, intended instances being (possibly complex) verbs.)
"' At least this is how defenses of the ultra-fine-grained account strike me. See, e.g.,
Goldman, supra note 12, at 1571-72. I largely agree with the points that Moore makes
about date and tense in offering objections to the fine-grained but not the ultra-fine-
grained account. See, e.g., IRVING THALBERG, PERCEPTION, EMOTION AND ACTION: A
COMPONENT APPROACH (1977);JUDrrHJ. THOMSON, ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS (1977).
But I think that his confusion leads him to make some needless concessions to those
who defend that account.
" I think that nearly everyone who writes in the area sometimes talks in ways that
partake of the confusion; but it is only when these ways of talking are used in the
formulation of crucial theses that we are actually led astray. Even Davidson, who
more than anyone else is responsible for encouraging us to focus on the particulars,
goes in for the confused way of talking, taking "primitive" (his version of "basic") to
apply to actions. See DONALD DAVIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS
43, 49 (1980). I know what Davidson meant when he said there that all we ever do
is move our bodies, and I think that what he meant is true (given the odd qualifica-
tion, which we can all agree about). But I don't think that what he said is literally
true.
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of course he does not always make it. 9 (If he were always to make
it, he would be unable to recognize actions as items in a category of
particulars or of events.) On almost every page of Act and Crime,
however, Moore uses some phrase to speak of something someone
did, and forthwith takes himself to have referred to a particular. In
the area of "basicness," it is evidently important not to do this,
because of the readiness with which contradictions flow. But the
distinction between the particulars that are actions and the things
that people do is the crux of the account of individuation that
Moore accepts, and it must be resolutely maintained in all areas.
III. AcTUs REI
The example in Part I showed Moore's confusion operating in
two different directions. On the one hand, it led him to apply the
predicate "basic" to actions when it does not properly apply to
them. On the other hand, it led him to refuse to apply the
predicate "basic" to things done when (relative to actions) it does
properly apply to them. A further example of the confusion's
operating so as to obscure things done is shown in Moore's
treatment of criminal liability.
Moore says that a person is criminally liable if he has "done
" The places where Moore temporarily avoids the confusion are places where he
is accusing his opponents of it.
Consider Moore's handling of an objection to the identity thesis (which asserts the
identity of actions with bodily movements)-the objection that says that one can do
some act using any of a variety of bodily movements. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 90.
When he first addresses the objection, his confusion is very evident. He says that the
identity thesis is misconstrued, because of "the failure to restrict the acts one
considers to basic acts." Id. What is this supposed to mean? If in inquiring whether
each action is the same as some bodily movement we have to restrict ourselves to
bodily movements (which is what Moore says basic acts are), then it seems that we are
allowed to consider only instances of the thesis that say that a bodily movement is the
same as a bodily movement. The identity thesis at issue is more interesting than that
of course.
The correct answer to the objection is that the acts to whose distinctness the
objector points (which I call "things done") are in a different category from the
actions that the identity thesis is concerned with. Moore eventually gets around to
this answer: he says: "The identity of act-tokens with movement-tokens is in no way
affected by [an] argument against type-identities." Id. at 91. The trouble is that the
"act-types" Moore speaks of here are the very things that the basic/nonbasic
distinction cuts across. That is, they are the very things that Moore has very recently
insisted are particulars (or "act-tokens"), not "type[s] of act." Id. at 81.
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an act that instantiates a type of action prohibited by some stat-
ute."2 ' But one could just as well say that a person is criminally
liable if he has done something prohibited by statute. Moore's
circumlocution is seen to be superfluous when it is recognized that
the things people do line up with types of action. An account of
actus rei can then be rather simple. Among the things people do,
actus rei are prohibited ones. Actus rei are simply a species of
things done-a species determined by criminal statutes and deserv-
ing their Latin name by virtue of that.
Actually, it is not only Moore's reluctance to distinguish actions
from things people do which leads him into complications over
criminal liability. He wants an account of actus rei in which a
general mens rea requirement, which he calls the "act requirement,"
is built into the idea of actus reus. He builds in one himself as a
part of the circumlocutory detour through "act which instantiates a
type," speaking there of types of "action," and using "action" to put
the "act requirement" in place. But a mens rea requirement (if
desired) could be built in without the circumlocution, by saying that
an actus reus is done if and only if there is an action that is
someone's doing some criminally prohibited thing. This account
has the effect Moore wanted, of ensuring that the notion of "an
action" is always implicit when any actus reus is said to be done.
2 1
Whether the introduction of "an action" actually does supply the
materials needed for stating a general mens rea requirement is
controversial, as Moore is aware. Sleepwalkers and people under
the influence of hypnotism (for instance) may not exhibit the kind
of voluntariness involved in general mens rea, but their deeds seem
to be actions nonetheless. Moore's opinion is that sleepwalkers'
deeds are actions only metaphorically.22 This opinion (which I
return to in Part VIII below) helps to shore up his overall view that
"action," in the sense of his theory, is the fundamental notion for
criminal law.
20 Id. at 189.
21 Moore sometimes gets this effect (of ensuring "action" is implicit) by using "as
an action." He asks, for example, "whether post-hypnotic movement with death as
its consequence is.a kind of killing (as an action)." Id. at 256. But there is no kind
of killing that is "as an action." Rather, some killings are actions and some are not:
it depends upon what else is true of them. See discussion infra app.
2 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 254.
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IV. ACTIONS
In Part II, I considered "the identity of complex with basic acts,"
and I turn now to "the identity of actions with bodily move-
ments."2" This means that I address Moore's two identity theses
in the opposite order from that in which he defended them. But
Moore's own route through the various controversies is not a very
inviting one. It is odd to think that one can know that a bodily
movement was an action while not yet knowing whether, for
example, someone's deliberate tearing up of a contract might also
be an action. Yet this describes the state of mind of a reader at the
end of part I of Moore's book, when she is meant already to have
accepted Moore's claims about bodily movements, but not yet to
have raised such questions as whether someone's moving her body
is ever her doing something more interesting than moving her body.
Chapter l's identities being accepted, when someone X-s by Y-
ing, her X-ing is (typically) the same as her Y-ing. So when an agent
does something by moving her body, the event of her doing that
something is (typically)2 4 an event of her moving a bit of her body.
The appeal of the thesis that actions are people's bodily movings
surely derives in part from the thought that it is by moving our
bodies that we get done the more interesting things that we do.
Actions cannot be circumscribed by reference to this thought alone,
of course, because there are things people do, like blink the eyelids
in the normal way, their doings of which things are not their
actions. Some other element is needed.
We saw how a general mens rea requirement can be built into
an account of actus rei by introducing "action" there: apparently
"action" imports a psychological element.2 5 There is reason then
to think that some psychological concept must enter into any defini-
tion of "an action." It is by no means a novel idea that "intentional-
ly" must be brought in. The definition I favor, whose home is the
account presented here as an alternative to Moore's, states: "There
is an action if and only jf there is an event of a person's intentionally
doing something."26
23 Id. at 78.
24 The qualifier "typically" is necessary here because it is not sufficient for
someone's X-ing's being her Y-ing that she should have X-d by Y-ing. ("By"'s behavior
is thus more complicated than I acknowledge in this paper, but my simplifications do
not affect the debate with Moore.)
25 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
2' The definition I advocate may not seem familiar, but it is actually the core of
1994] 1727
1728 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 142:1719
It would detract from this definition to follow Moore in his
confusion between "an action" (which is defined here) and "a
something" that a person does (in terms of which the definition is
given). The definition can be seen to work out as it should only
when distinctions are admitted between the various things an agent
does when there is an action of hers. In a recent real situation, a
pilot accidentally shut down the airplane's engines. If we are to
understand how his making his mistake was an action, then we have
to avoid speaking as if the things he did were actions. One thing
the pilot did was to shut down the engines, and he did not do this
intentionally. His doing this, however, was his depressing of four
levers, and depressing the levers was something that he did
intentionally. For an event actually to have been an action of a
person's, according to the definition, it has to be true only that at
least one of the things she did was something she intentionally did.
In a more familiar but less felicitous locution: it has to be true that
"her action was intentional under one of its descriptions." 7
V. BODILY MOVEMENTS
We saw that insofar as a person moves her body in order to get
something done, her doing something is her moving her body-
usually her moving of some bit of her body, of course. 28 The
introduction of "intentionally" evidently makes no difference here:
we do what we intentionally do. So the account of individuation
that Moore and I agree about, in the presence of the use of
"intentionally" to characterize actions, secures the identity thesis
first endorsed by Moore: the identity of "actions with bodily
movements." This thesis he makes into the title of his chapter 5.
The claim Moore brings to the fore in that chapter, however, is
a familiar account. Cf. infra note 27 and accompanying text.
27 One trouble about "intentional under a description" is that people no sooner
adopt the locution than they talk about doing things under descriptions. Then it
seems that the things that we do have various descriptions (to which "intentional" may
or may not be added). The things that people do, however, do not have various
descriptions: people's actions have various descriptions, and the various descriptions
correspond (one-to-one, probably) with the things they do relative to the actions. Cf.
supra notes 10, 12, 14 and accompanying text. It is because those who accept
Davidson's account usually follow Davidson in resorting to the formal mode that my
definition may seem unfamiliar.
2' The fact that we mention which bit of the body was moved in specifying any
action contributes to the unsuitability of the generic "bodily movement" to denote an
action. For more and Moore on the use of "movement," see infra note 29.
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not the identity of an action with a person's moving of a bit of her
body, but, seemingly, the identity of her action with a bit of her
body's moving. Since Moore denies the identity of a person's
moving of her body with her body's moving (that is, he denies the
identity of a making of a movement with a movement 2"), it then
seems that the thesis just secured for him must be one he rejects.
(If a is the same as inl, as Moore seemingly says, then a is not the
same as her making a movement unless m, is the same as her
making a movement.) But the inconsistency here is apparent only:
in due course, Moore assures us that the identity of "basic actions
and bodily movements" is a "partial identity."0 Using Moore's
terminology, one says that an action is identical with a movement,
when what one means is that a movement, is a part of an action.
It is a good question why Moore should allow the name
"identity" to take in the relation "has as a proper part." (Those of
us who think that a nose is a part of a person are not inclined to
express the thought by saying that persons are identical with their
noses.) Moore appears to have two reasons for his extraordinary
terminology, both connected with how he thinks about the debates.
First, he wants to distance himself from those who deny that
movements, are even parts of actions. He speaks of "ease of
exposition" as leading him to set things up as he does, thinking,
presumably, that the contrast between his position and his oppo-
nents' will be clearer if he exaggerates his own, using "is identical
to" for "overlaps with.""1 Secondly, Moore wants his own thesis
I Moore follows the use I made in Actions of subscripts to distinguish between
"move" used as a transitive verb ("moveT") and as an intransitive one ("move,"). I
carry on with the subscripts in what follows, but reading Moore has made me regret
the use of "movementT," which needs careful handling. There are no occurrences of
"movementT" here except when I am reporting Moore.
When you use "movementT," you are under the impression that you are thinking
about something to which the transitive verb applies (there is after all a "T" in its
description); but you could be under that impression even while what you are actually
thinking about is a movement, and a movement is not an event to which the transitive
verb obviously applies (aside from philosophers' shorthand). An event in whose
description "moveT" occurs is specified with, for example, "a person's moving of her
leg," and it is not obvious that "movement" (in any sense) readily serves as shorthand
for this. ("Moving" has a better chance of serving.) The generic "bodily" (of "bodily
movement") only helps to ensure that you are not thinking of something to which the
transitive verb obviously applies, cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text, so that you
can be reinforced in the illusion that you are thinking about something you are not
actually thinking about.
s MOORE, supra note 1, at 84.
s' Id. Moore's explication of "identity" where it is "only partial," id., has it as
equivalent to "overlapping" in the mereologists' sense. I speak of Moore's meaning
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about actions and movements, to be seen as showing "how [actions]
are just part of the ordinary physical world": we are to find his
thesis "interesting" because reductive, whereas his opponent's is
"trivial" because nonreductive
3 2
I shall come to Moore's, "reductionism" at the end. As for the
claim that movements are parts of actions, which gets exaggerated
and expressed as a claim of identity, it is bound up in Moore with
the claim that volitions too are parts of actions. Moore has different
ways of saying what actions (wholly as opposed to partially) are:
a "bodily-movement-caused-by-a-volition,"33  a "causal sequence
volitions-cause-bodily movement,," 34 and "volitions causing bodily
movements." 35 But however he puts it, the idea is that each action
is a composite event having as its parts (1) a volition, (2) a
movement,, and (3) such events as mediate causally between the
volition and the movementi. 6
VI. VOLITIONS
Moore devotes a long section to volitions' various character-
istics" before he broaches "The Argument for Volitions." 8
Again, it seems to me that he takes matters backwards. It is hard to
engage in a discussion of something's character until one is sure
"has as a proper part" by "identical": this is in order to convey the actual claim that
he expresses when he uses "identical" not meaning what the English word "identical"
means.
32 Id. at 83.
3s Id. at 169.
34Id. at 84.
35 Id. at 85.
3 At least I think that this is the idea. Moore tells us that a volition is a state, and
it is unclear that an event can have a state as one of its parts. Yet Moore certainly
does think of actions as events at moments when he is not telling us what their parts
are; his "partial identity" claim (a overlaps with m,) is of course consistent with the
real identity claim (a is the same as m,) that derives from a view of actions as events.
Perhaps Moore thinks that a "causal sequence" is an event of a certain sort, where the
parts of events of that sort need not be events.
The last paragraph of Part V does not address all of the unclarities in Moore's
claims about what actions actually are. The "bodily movement caused by a volition"
account of them appears to rescind the claim that the "identity" of actions with
movements, is only "partial," as does a remark that "[v]olitions... mediate between
... motivations and... intentions.., and... actions." Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
The "volitional causings of bodily movements" specification, on the other hand,
appears to interfere with the idea that movements, are even parts of actions. (A
causing of a fire does not have a fire as a part.)
37 See id. at 113-33.
3 Id. at 133-55.
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that it exists. And if we are meant to think that we know that there
are volitions because they can be shown to be indispensable from a
certain role in defining action, then we might expect our knowledge
of their role to show us what their properties are. At any rate, I
shall consider the argument for volitions before considering what
they are supposed to be like.
The argument is driven by the thought that actions are
experienced and conceived differently from movements,. Moore
says: "One of the keystones to thinking of ourselves metaphysically,
morally, and legally is to conceive of personal agency as distinct
from mere physical involvement .. . . "" Indeed. This is what
leads us to think that a psychological element has to come into a
definition of "an action," and what has led me to introduce the term
"intentionally." Moore does not consider using the adverb to define
actions. But he does criticize a Davidsonian account of action,
which follows naturally enough from the "intentionally" definition,
and which he takes to be "truly competitive with the volitional theo-
ry."40 His criticism is that the Davidsonian, "belief-desire" account
leaves something out and fails to explain "why actions seem so
distinctive from other bodily events."41 In order to explain this,
Moore thinks, we have to find some propositional attitude-state of
the agent intermediate between her believing or desiring something
and a bodily event.
3
9 d. at 135.
40 Id. at 136 (referring to DONALD DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in
ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS, supra note 18, at 3, and subsequent essays reprinted
in Davidson's book). The Davidson definition of action follows from the "intention-
ally" definition because we see someone as X-ing intentionally where (roughly) we see
her as believing something and as wanting something, so that relative to that, she is
intelligibly led to X.
41 Id. at 137. Those who aspire to an analysis of action criticize the belief/desire
account for failing to offer sufficient conditions of there being an action, the failure
being revealed in examples of "deviant causal chains." Id. at 159. One might think
that Moore wished to introduce volitions because he took an explanation of "why
actions seem so distinctive from other bodily events" to require an analysis. But
Moore's criticism is not that a belief/desire account fails to discover "a conceptual
essence to action": he "no longer believes it fruitful to seek" such an essence. Id. at
160. And he says that "there plainly are instances of volitions (deviantly) causing
movements,, where those volitionally caused movements, are not actions." Id. at 161.
Of course a definition in terms of "intentionally" will seem to fall short of an
analysis. The purpose of this note is to make it clear that Moore's definition is no
different. (When it is acknowledged that there may be "deviant causal chains," and
that "nondeviance" cannot be analyzed, it has to be allowed that no conceptual
analysis of "action" is possible.)
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Moore's thought now is that movements, do not spring directly
from beliefs and desires. This is surely right: if an agent's body is
to move, then she has got to do something, not just to think and to
want. But that only shows that we need, in addition to the idea of
bodily events, the idea of a person's moving of a bit of her body.
Moore does not tell us why-once we are allowed to use the
transitive verb "moveT" and can speak of a person's intentionally
doing something-we are short of resources for saying how actions
are distinguished from all other events. When my definition of "an
action" is available, nothing compels us to think that "[b]elief-desire
sets exercise their causation . .. through this concluding proposi-
tional attitude [the volition]."4" From my point of view, then,
Moore introduces a volition as a substitute for applying (to an event
that is a person's moving of a bit of her body) the concepts that
enable us to see a person as an agent (who does things intentional-
ly). If "actions" can be adequately defined in the way I suggest,
volitions must now be viewed as figments, filling an imagined
lacuna.4 3
If the introduction of volitions enabled us only to say again with
a new word things that we could have said before they were
invented, then it would not be a source of error necessarily:
volitions might be merely needless. But worse faults than needless-
ness could attach to volitions. If their introduction licenses new
conclusions, which have to be rejected given volitions' fictitious
nature, then it is a source of error, and volitions are illegitimate.
Moore's volitions seem to me to hover precariously between the
illegitimate and the needless. He has pretensions for them, and
does not want us to think of them as stipulated into existence. But
as soon as he gives them actual work to do, he resorts to intuitive
thinking, and thus relies on what he thought he knew before
volitions were introduced. I shall try to make this out by attending
to volitions' "contents," and then to general mens rea.
42 Id. at 138. I should come clean about the fact that I believe something similar
myself: I believe that someone's trying to do something is an event that precedes and
causes the movement, that there is when there is an action of hers; and that events
that are someone's trying to do something may be said to have contents. I defend
this against Moore's criticism in the Appendix.
"' It is not clear to me how, once one has imagined the lacuna (by failing to see
how it is filled by actions themselves), one can seriously think that Moore's volitions
fill it. If you manage to get puzzled about how a bodily movement, can spring
straight from a belief and a desire, and you accept that a bodily movement, is not
itself an action, then will it not be something "active" that you crave in an account?
But "'volition'... name[s] ... non-active mental states." Id. at 116.
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VII. CONTENTS
Moore's own description of volitions as a species of intention
(albeit, remarkably, "bare intentions")44 might encourage us to
think that the contents of volitions can go hand in hand with what
ordinarily falls inside the scope of "intentionally." Then the
introduction of volitions would be conservative, as it were, enabling
us to recapitulate with a new definition of "an action" what we
could always have said with an old.45 In that case, we should say
that the pilot in our example volited to depress the levers, and that
he did not volit to shut down the engines. Saying such things has
few attractions to be sure. But if they were meant only to record
the facts of the case as we already had them, they might be
innocuous. Certainly they would attribute contents to volitions that
satisfy, as well as any could, Moore's desire to specify volitions in
terms of "the role they play in proximately causing bodily motions
and in being the effects of both our more general intentions and the
belief-desire sets the latter execute."
46
The contents of Moore's volitions are conceived much more
narrowly than this, however. In the first place, they are bodily only:
one cannot volit to depress the levers, but can volit only something
relating to one's body.47 In the second place, "movements," alone
are the objects of volitions: whereas one intentionally moves one's
41 say "remarkably" because Hart coined "bare intention" for the case of
someone who intends to do something without doing (or having yet done) anything
to execute her intention. See H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 113, 117 (5th prtg. 1984). Volitions' bareness is all of a piece
with their "nonactive" character, I suppose. See supra note 43.
" Notice that if we did say that for each of the things that the agent intentionally
did there was a volition with corresponding content, then we should not be piling up
items. If volitions were events (as it might seem that they had to be to be parts of
actions), then we should think of each new volitional content as providing us with a
new description of some event. If volitions were states (as they are in Moore's official
view), then someone's voliting (say) five things in the case of a single action would be
no more problematic than (say) her believing five things about Act and Crime. For an
explanation of my usage of "voliting," see infra note 51.
Notice also that the contents of "trying to -," even if they are not propositions,
can be "propositional" in the sense of having concepts (or whatever we think the
constituents of propositions are) as their constituents. See supra note 42.
46 MOORE, supra note 1, at 131. We are told nothing in particular about volitions'
contents in being told that volitions are proximate causes of bodily motions. The
contents of states that play a role in the causal explanation of actions characteristically
concern things that may be quite remote from people's bodies. And Moore assures
us that volitions are "Intentional," and that they "have cognitive content." Id. at 123-
24.
47 See id. at 128.
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finger but one's finger does not intentionally move, one volits that
one's finger move rather than that one move one's finger.41 These
two points place constraints on volitions beyond any given by the
use of "intentionally" in the common sense scheme.
49
The constraints they place are so severe in fact that we must
wonder now whether there are actually enough volitions to go
round. Our capacities to affect the world by our actions demand
rather little of us in the way of beliefs about how we move our
bodies. When we engage in the practice of skills that require, for
instance, the manipulation of things-of hammers and drills and
screwdrivers if we are handy with them, or of the keys of keyboards
if we are musicians or typists-it is unclear that we employ any
beliefs concerning purely and simply the movements of our hands
and fingers.5" And if people usually move their bodies without
exercising any detailed bodily movement concepts, then someone's
voliting that a bit of her body move, thus and so (where "thus and
so" tokens some detailed specification of a movement) will be rather
rare.
Moore brings in a volition for each action, so that the volitions
4' See id. at 125-26.
41 Some of the constraints might seem to go away in the light of Moore's
statement that "transparent constructions can be created by volitional usages." Id. at
125. But volitions presumably partake of the opacity of Intentional states. Cf supra
note 45. (I do not understand Moore on the subject of transparency.)
o The question whether a belief about a bodily movement enters into a common
sense psychological explanation is different from the question whether the agent
possessed that belief. When you ask how I turned the pages of the book, I am
capable of realizing that I used one or the other hand, and I might be able to tell
from my posture that I had used my left hand. This does not seem to me to establish
that it is any part of the explanation of my using my left hand to turn a page that I
believed that I would turn it by using my left hand. If this is correct, then we may
possess more beliefs about what we do than beliefs we use in practice. (In the
argument that follows in the text, I rely only on the fact that the beliefs we possess
set a limit on those we use in practice.)
Moore is aware that he had better make it plausible that our agency requires the
exercise of more fine-grained beliefs about our bodily motions than we might have
thought. But the examples he gives, see MOORE, supra note 1, at 153-54, focus on
fineness of grain and not on bodily motions. (For instance, the declarative knowledge
that a tiro tier is said to have about how a tie is knotted speaks of the tie rather than
of the hands that move it.) Moore reminds us that "as skills are mastered it is often
the case that conscious attention to discrete motor movements hinders rather than
helps the performance of these movements." Id. at 154. This is true: thinking about
how something is done can be an obstacle to doing it; while the child who is learning
a skill must attend to what she is doing, someone who has acquired the skill will -not.
But it seems preposterous to suppose that it follows from this that the content of the
child's consciousness is given in propositions about discrete motor movements.
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in his story cannot be allowed to be as uncommon as a common
sense account of ourselves as agents would suggest. His volitions
with their contents prove not to be mere by-products of a common
sense psychological account of ourselves; they are not volitions of
the merely needless sort. A question about their legitimacy is then
bound to arise.
Of course there is nothing illegitimate about the supposition
that there can be an account of the workings of the human motor
system that mentions states embodying highly detailed information
about kinds of bodily motion. Such a subpersonal account speaks
of systems and subsystems and their states: it does not relate
persons to contents, as an account of propositional attitudes-or an
account that says what a person volits-does. t In not mentioning
persons, a subpersonal account prescinds from what we know
commonsensically about our bodily movements. To learn it, one
has to find out things about how human bodies move which are no
part either of what we all know in being agents, or of what we can
know in being philosophical or legal students of agency. Something
we can know is that X-ing is a proper explanandum of the common
sense psychological scheme only if people have beliefs in the
ascription of which X-ing could be mentioned. But at a subpersonal
level, there are descriptions in an account that cannot belong in any
account of what people believe. Even physiologists do not know
what kinds of proprioceptive information bear on the specificities
of the movements that animals, including human ones, make.
5 2
There is no reason to think that the informational contents of the
states of the motor system they will eventually describe mesh with
the propositions that figure in our homely ways of understanding
one another. 3
s" I have introduced "to volit" as a reminder that there is a subject of any volition;
by speaking always of volitions simply, Moore manages to make it seem as if these
could be, as it were, free-floating states, of anything.
"2 Reading physiologists' recent work on the cerebellum's role in the monitoring
and production of movements, one learns how little is known about a correct
subpersonal story.
" My argument has been quick, and has not taken account of everything Moore
says in defense of his position. I went for a stronger conclusion in my 1986 article.
See Jennifer Hornsby, Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour, in SUBJEcr,
THOUGHT, AND CONTExT 95-115 (Philip Pettit &John McDowell eds., 1986) (arguing
against the kind of functionalism that Moore hopes to use to prop up his volitions).
Moore himself allows that "whether volitions exist is ... very much an open,
scientific question." MOORE, supra note 1, at 165. As it seems to me, it is an open,
scientific question what style of subpersonal account will handle voluntary motor
output. This is different from the question whether Moore's volitions exist: their
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Moore means us to think that the volitions' contents are both
given subpersonally, and also are contents of the sort by reference
to which people can understand one another as agents. To the
extent that no contents fill the bill, his volitions are illegitimate.
VIII. VOLUNTARINESS
Volitions enter into Moore's discussion of a putative problem
about somnambulist behavior (and the like),5 4 which we touched
on under actus rei above. On the one hand, the language of human
action appears to have a use in describing the person who walks in
her sleep; on the other hand, a certain defense in law appears to
take hold of her behavior, a defense that says that the defendant's
part in the putative crime was not the part of a genuine agent. It
seems that we may be forced to say either that the deeds of
sleepwalkers are not actions, or that there are actions that do not
satisfy the general mens rea condition for crime. Moore thinks that
volitions come in here, because he thinks that we may decide,
although "[w]e at present do not know enough.., about volitions
... to resolve the issue definitively,"5 5 that somnambulistic move-
ments are not volition-caused and are therefore not part of actions.
We have seen already that Moore thinks that the deeds of sleep-
walkers are actions only metaphorically: in fact, he suggests that
they should be assimilated to inanimate happenings that are not to
be "accounted for in any theory of human action."56 But then it
appears to be a prior attitude to sleepwalkers' behavior that leads
Moore to sucl confidence as he has that their movements are not
volition-caused.57 Volitions now appear needless.5 The question
about them (and a question about "intentionally" too) runs idly
alongside the question whether somnambulist behavior counts as
existence requires (a) that a subpersonal account be given in a certain style, and (b)
that it be continuous with a commonsense psychological one. It is against (b) that I
have argued.
" Moore takes a variety of cases. Good treatments of each will differ from one
another in many details. Being concerned only with the pattern of Moore's
arguments, I consider only one case and ignore the details.
55 MOORE, supra note 1, at 259.
"6 Id. at 254.
"' Presumably he would say that sentences, describing what a sleepwalker did,
admit of only metaphorical truth if they contain "intentionally," so that actions in my
sense, not just volitions in his, are absent from what a sleepwalker does.
" Moore concedes this when he acknowledges that the "belief-desire" theorists'
opinion about sleepwalkers and the like can go hand in hand with his own. Id. at 255.
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action. It is unclear in any case how we might have been supposed
to get independent purchase on the two questions.
With or without volitions, Moore's line is not congenial to
everyone: some people think that sleepwalkers' deeds are ac-
tions. 9 But there is no particular difficulty about holding onto
this other line. We might think that a correct general mens rea
requirement should insist not just on an action, but on an action
that is not in certain ways defective. Or we might state such a
requirement in terms of a notion of agency, saying that we have
general mens rea only when someone plays the part of a responsible
agent, and spelling out why that condition fails to be satisfied where
it is not. In the sleepwalker's case, we can find ourselves asking
whether her "will" came into play, and our asking this can make it
seem that some volitional notion is needed to understand what
constitutes a legally guilty mind. But the questions we now raise
about voluntariness are not questions about volitions in Moore's
sense-events that were supposed to be parts of actions. In
considering whether a defense of automatism is appropriate, we
sometimes ask whether a person was in a position to control her
movements in accord with her reason. Again this is a different
question from the question whether an action occurred.
It could be simply a mistake to suppose that the concept of
"action" can serve all by itself to say what is generally presupposed
to criminal guilt. Certainly where an elucidation of "action" is
guided by philosophical (or metaphysical) agenda, as Moore's is, it
cannot be taken for granted that "action" is uniquely the concept
that is foundational for criminal law. Philosophers have been
concerned with actions as I define them (and as I think Moore
attempts to define them) in part because they have wanted to mark
out a particular class of events in order to be able to raise clear
questions about the place of reasoning beings in a causal world. In
marking out this class, one does not make much progress with issues
about legal responsibility, because one does not introduce the
resources for addressing many questions of specific mens rea. And
it may be that one does not even illuminatingly circumscribe the
area in which questions of criminal guilt can properly arise.
" Moore cites Herbert Hart and Bernard Williams. See id. at 253. My own view,
like theirs, is that "action" does have application (although we should look elsewhere
for paradigm actions).
Perhaps it is not always determinate whether "is an action" applies; I am happy
if it can be vague whether "intentionally" contributes to literal truth.
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IX. OMISSIONS
Even if the idea of "an action" does not provide much insight,
"intentionally" can play a role in thinking about an area in which
Moore draws a blank.'
The first thing to notice is that someone can do something
intentionally without there being any action that is her doing the
thing. In addition to "an action," then (which was defined at Part
IV), we might define "an instance of action" by stating: "There is
an instance of action if and only if someone does something
intentionally." "An instance of action" covers more ground than
"an action" because it covers such a case as a person who makes her
protest by not attending a meeting. Something is done intentionally
in this case, but it is not done by moving the body, and there is no
event that is the person's doing it; she protests by omitting to do
something she might have done (attend the meeting). This might
be described as a negative action: "negative action" may apply
where there is an instance of action that does not consist in there
being an event which is an action.
In order to understand how the definition of "an action" using
"intentionally" works,61 we had to notice that a person's doing one
thing may be her doing another, different thing. We shall not get
everything straight, unless we also notice what sort of all-purpose
verb "do something" is. Verbs formed with "not" are still verbs, so
that not doing something is sometimes something someone does.
62
We can say, for example, that something she did was not attend the
meeting. Or again, if someone failed to answer a question because
she thought it was a stupid one, we might say that not answering
was something she did. Putting together the two points-that her
60 I am grateful to Bernard Williams for saving me from mistakes, by discouraging
me from including everything I had intended to say in this Section.
61 See discussion supra parts II and III.
6 When the things that people do are called "acts," the idea of a negative "act"
has to be the idea of "a thing a 'not' gets into" (like not going to the meeting). We
need to acknowledge the idea quite generally in order to understand the language of
action. If we say (schematically) that there is action only if there is an event of
someone's X-ing intentionally, or if we say that someone's X-ing can be the same as
her Y-ing, then we have to realize that a "not" might, or might not, be present in any
instance of"X" or of"Y." Whether a "not" occurs in some account of some instance
of agency is quite different from the question whether there is not an action in that
instance. Moore's appreciation of this is shown when he explains why a grammatical
distinction will not separate acts from omissions. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 24-25.
But he has a tendency nevertheless to assimilate omissions to "negative acts" (this
being part of a certain more general tendency).
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doing one thing can be her doing another, and that there are things
people do that a "not" gets into as it were-it becomes easy to
understand how there can be cases that have one hallmark of action
(someone does something intentionally) but that lack the hallmark
of an action (there is no event that is her doing it). Bodily move-
ments can be absent where the phenomenon of action is present.
The absence of bodily movements is what Moore latches onto to
characterize omissions, calling these the "absence of any willed
bodily movements. "  The consequence of his account is that
there are trillions of omissions on the part of each person at any
moment. A good account of omissions will surely have to be more
specific and avoid such multiplication. Not that a good account can
confine itself to negative actions as defined above; there are many
more cases of failure to do something which count intuitively as
omissions than there are cases in which something, whether positive
or negative, is intentionally done.
We have, then, to look further afield than "intentionally" in
order to characterize omissions. But we know that the ideas needed
to delineate a class of actions cannot get us very far with questions
about legal responsibility. So we should not be inclined to think
that those ideas on their own might fully describe omissions. When
there is an action, the agent can be culpable for doing things that
he did not then do intentionally, because, say, he was careless or
reckless in doing them; equally when there is not an action, a
person can be culpable for not doing things that he did not then
intentionally not do, because he was careless or reckless in not
doing them. One is sometimes held responsible for having done
something one should have known one was doing; one is sometimes
also held responsible for not having done something one should
have remembered to do. Quite obviously "intentionally" is not the
only word used in connection with human beings qua responsible
agents. A correct treatment of omissions can avail itself of any of
the normative notions that may attach to specific mens rea.
64
63 Id. at 28.
64 This is not to suggest that culpability attaches equally to actions and omissions
that are equivalent in point of causal upshot. (How we think about this other
positive/negative matter will depend upon how we define omissions more exactly.)
It can be a separate question whether, as Moore plausibly thinks, consideration
of the justifications given for state punishment will show that in a legal context the
distinction between culpability attaching where there is an action and culpability
attaching where there is an omission should be differently drawn from how it would
be drawn in another context.
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The point of picking on negative actions here has only been to
make it clear that the psychological ideas implicit in "is an action"
have application outside the class of events which they can be used
to demarcate. When that is clear, a conception of "human action"
that is limited, as is Moore's, to a conception of bodily motions
already seems unduly limited. And when this is acknowledged, we
shall notice the richness of the language of responsibility, and feel
free to look for an account of omissions elsewhere than in the event-
based philosophy of action that drives Moore's accounts of
everything.
If "bodily involvement" is not required for "personal agency,"
then it is only to be expected that there may be omissions that are
punishable. Punishable omissions provide a counterexample to
Moore's overall thesis that "the criminal law cares about ... no
more than the bodily motions of persons."65 Moore concedes the
counterexamples, calling them exceptions. His thought is that by
treating them as exceptions, he can better attend to "the metaphysi-
cal question of what sorts of things acts [that is, actions] are."
66
X. REDUCTIONISM
Why does Moore attach such importance to "the metaphysical
question"? Certainly it is not an unimportant question how actions
are to be distinguished from other events: in fact, I suggested above
that philosophers especially should be concerned with it. But why
should Moore set his sights so narrowly that a satisfying answer to
the metaphysical question is supposed to have been obtained when
we know that actions are "no more than the bodily motions of
persons?" 67  Well, Moore's desire for a reductive thesis would
account for the "no more than," and it might explain why he thinks
of his project as he does. "Reductionism" is my last topic: I want
to show that Moore cannot get any mileage out of it.
We encountered Moore's "reductive" thesis in trying to account
for his peculiar use of "identity." The reductive thesis says that
actions are "partially identical" with bodily movements,, and it is
said to show "how actions are part of the ordinary physical
' Id. at vii.
6 Id. at 89. They are said to be exceptions, see id. at 59, and this is acknowledged
to be a concession, see id. at 89 (which is one of the places where Moore's attachment
to the metaphysical question is shown).
6 Id. at 83.
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world.""8 Moore takes the thesis to separate his position from my
own. But it is not obvious why I, or anyone else, might dream of
denying what it is said to show. Anyone who accepts that people
inhabit "the ordinary physical world" is likely to think that it need
not be shown that actions are in the ordinary physical world. It
seems that Moore's standard of the "ordinary physical" must be
unusually exacting.
Moore evidently thinks that bodily movements, have an
especially strong claim to be "part of the ordinary physical world."
As if to draw attention to the psychologically uncontaminated
character of movements,, he says that "'move[]'. .. is non-commit-
tal about whether the event in question [partially] is or [partially] is
not an act[ion]."6 9 Perhaps his idea is that we can think of bodily
movements, as the kind of colorless items that even the most
staunch behaviorist would acknowledge-items that would be there
even if (as they tell us we may hypothesize) we were all robots.
Bodily movements then could be thought of as "parts" not only of
everyone's "ordinary physical world," but also, as it were, of the
mindless, exactingly physical world. If concepts for colorless things
could be shown to suffice to pick out all the actions, then a sort of
reductionism about "action" would be established. And it would be
a reductionism that lent credence to Moore's idea that subpersonal
accounts are continuous with a commonsensical, personal account.
But how might a reductionism about action be obtained from
connecting actions with bodily movements,?
There are two difficulties. In the first place, the fact (if it is
one) that some bodily movements, are colorless does nothing to
establish that all of them are. Call movements that are related to
actions (as effects, as parts, or by identity, depending on your views)
A-movements; call movements that are in no way associated with
actions (hands blown by the wind, or the calf in a knee-jerk
reaction) C-movements. Take something that is actually an A-
movement. Could it have been a C-movement? Arguably No. And
if No, then, even though we must agree with Moore about "movex"'s
noncommittal character, we might want to treat "movement," as
covering a significantly different species of event. The colorness of
the C-movements, could then carry no consequences at all for
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actions might be supposed to be. Even if Moore thought that
actions were literally (that is, wholly) identical with movements,, and
even if he thought that some movements, are completely colorless,
nothing reductive could be established about actions.
But in any case-and this is the second difficulty-Moore does
not think that actions are literally identical with movements: the
"reductive" thesis says that parts of them are movements,. But then
however colorless any movement, might be meant to be, no
reductionism about action is forthcoming. It is as if Moore had
thought that he could render actions colorless by drawing attention
to their putatively colorless putative parts. But it is quite unclear
how that might have been meant to work.
The "reductive" thesis is set in opposition to one that Moore
misleadingly expresses as the identity of actions with bodily
movementsT. This is actually just the thesis that is delivered by the
account of actions' individuation that Moore endorses-a thesis
about real (non-"partial") identities, expressed nonmisleadingly as
the identity of an action with a person's moving of a bit of her
body.7' This is "trivial," Moore says, and it "becomes a non-
reductive account of action."71 Well, since he is committed to it,
we have to suppose that he thinks that something is gained from
asserting in addition to it (to the "trivial" thesis) the "interesting"
one. But the "interesting" thesis is the one that we have just seen
does not lead anywhere.
Wherever the "interesting" thesis might have been meant to take
one, Moore does not allow himself to be led there anyway. For all
his claims about movements,, Moore actually denies that the staunch
behaviorists' resources can characterize actions. Moore gives it as
a reason for holding sleepwalkers' deeds not to be caused by
volitions that verbs appropriate to human action are extended to
sleepwalkers only metaphorically. And he gives it as a reason for
introducing volitions that "personal agency" has to be conceived as
distinct from "mere physical involvement." So, like most of the rest
of us, he takes an event's being an action to go hand in hand with
some human, personal, or psychological predicate's applying to it
literally. And that means that even if the movements associated
with actions were colorless, actions themselves would not be.
The "reductive" thesis has no reductionist consequences. And
70 Cf supra note 29 and accompanying text.
71 MOORE, supra note 1, at 83.
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reductionism is a red herring. It has been worth unearthing
because its powerful scent explains Moore's chasing after bodily
motions as he does. In making them the quarry, Moore gets
distracted from the real identity thesis to which he is committed.
I am not sure that it turns on whether this thesis is "trivial" or
"interesting"; I am sure, however, that Moore and I can agree that
it has the virtue at least of truth.
CONCLUSION
When we begin, not with bodily motions, but with ideas about
people doing things, we are well-placed to say what distinguishes
actions from other events, and we can agree with Moore that
"physical involvements" by people qua agents are movingsT (by
people) of bodies. The account we are led to has no trouble with
omissions, and no truck with volitions. In the light of it, it seems
that Moore has no better reason for his curiously lax account of
omissions than that omissions are not examples of bodies in motion.
And it also seems, in the light of the account we are led to, that
Moore gives an inadequate argument that volitions must enter a
theory, and then tailors the notion of "a volition" so as to be able to
maintain that the theoretical understanding he takes himself to have
achieved is that which lawyers advocating an "act requirement" had
always sought.
Encouraged by a spurious reductionism, and by his own strange
terminology of "partial identity," Moore gives pride of place to
bodily movements,. And once volitions have been made a focus,
Moore quite loses sight of the possibility of concentrating on a class
of events (people's doings) and saying which of them are the
actions. But the greatest source of Moore's disregard of actions
themselves is surely his tendency to confuse them with other
things-with things in the category to which actus rei belong. Moore
recognizes that actus rei line up not with actions but with types of
action when he says that "a criminal code . .. prohibits approxi-
mately 7000 types of actions."72 It is lucky that there are not so
many types of aberration for the wandering theorist.
2Id. at 1.
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APPENDIX
Before Moore brings us to his argument for volitions proper
(which I considered in Part VI), he gives us an argument to show
that "in order for there to be a basic action of VT-ing," a "physical
effect Vring must be caused by a willing, trying, or other mental act,
and it must also be the object of such a mental act or mental
state."73 If the argument succeeded, it would simultaneously
establish both a neutral volitionist/"trying to" thesis (a thesis which
Moore and I might seem to agree about) and the claim which Moore
thinks crucially separates the two of us. In this Appendix, I shall
show two things: (1) that my own thesis about "trying to" neither
needs nor gains support from any argument for a neutral thesis; and
(2) that there are difficulties about understanding the claims which
Moore takes to separate us.
(1) I think that the concept of "trying to" has some of the
properties that Moore thinks some volitionalist notion must have.
In particular, I think that someone's trying to do something is an
event that precedes and causes the movement, that there is when
there is an action of hers, and that events that are someone's trying
to - may be said to have contents.7 4 What distinguishes my own
view from Moore's is that I do not think that we can show that
"trying to" has its (relatively) ubiquitous application by saying that
there must be a mental kind such that events of that kind immedi-
ately cause movements. My own argument for "try"'s (relatively)
ubiquitous application is rather an argument (which can be given in
the case where there is an event of A's X-ing) for a thesis about "try
to," namely: (7): A X-d intentionally - A tried to X. Given the
definability of "an action" using "intentionally," and given the
account of actions' individuation that Moore and I both subscribe
to, it is a consequence of thesis (7) that each action is an event of
a person's trying to do something.
Moore calls me a "mental-action theorist."75 But this name for
my position appears bound to mislead. Whether or not I accepted
(T), I would think that an action is a person's moving of a bit of her
body. Does that give me any claim to be a "physical action
theorist"? Again, whether or not I accepted (7), I would think that
an action is someone's doing something intentionally. Does that
73 Id. at 104.
7' Cf. supra note 42 and accompanying text.
75 MOORE, supra note 1, at 97.
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already put me in the "mental-action" camp? Or is it when I go on
to say that "try to" has application to every action that I am
supposed to be revealed as thinking that actions are "mental"?
(2) The "crucial issue," in Moore's opinion, which "[n]one of
Hornsby's three arguments even touch," 76 is whether, when there
is an action and someone moves a bit of his body, there is any
"simpler or more basic action by which he performs such move-
mentr." 77 It is to be expected that my arguments would not touch
this, because I do not think it makes sense: actions are not related
by "more basic,"78 and "perform movements-r" means nothing to
me unless it means "move something." 79  Still Moore may be
attempting to say something here that is fine by everyone: in one
important and intuitive sense of "basic," to accept that move the arm,
say, was the (most) basic thing is to allow that there was nothing the
agent intentionally did by doing when she moved her arm. (The
idea of basicness employed here is that which I called "teleological"
in Actions.)"0 Moore says: "[w]hich acts are basic is the ultimate
issue between the mental-action theorist and the volitional theory
that I defend. " " But when it is allowed that there are different
notions of basicness,12 there is seen to be more than one question
of "which is basic."
The idea of basicness used now to understand Moore's belief
that "there is no simpler or more basic action by which he performs
such movementT"83 is attuned to our thinking about ourselves as
agents ("intentionally" enters into its definition). But Moore's real
concern in the argument is with matters we ordinarily do not think
about when we think about ourselves as agents: he provides us with
what is supposed to be another way of seeing the crucial issue when
he asks whether "he does [any] contractingT of his muscles as an
action of his." 4 I think that neither "does any contractingT of his
muscles" nor "as an action" is readily intelligible. I shall take one
at a time.
"He does contractingT of his muscles" is a neat illustration of the
76 Id. at 102.
7 Id.
"8 See discussion supra part I.
79 Cf supra part V.
80 HoRNsBY, AcTIONS, supra note 15, at 78-88.
81 MOORE, supra note 1, at 98.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
8 MOORE, supra note 1, at 102.
8 Id.
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pressure Moore puts himself under to conflate things that are done
with particulars: "does contractingT" here seems to be suspended
between something he might do-contract-and an event that is his
doing it-his contracting. 5  If we take "does contracting of' to
mean simply "contracts" (which is the only thing that it can mean),
then the question that Moore says is crucial is the question whether
he contracts his muscles "as an action of his."
"As an action" may direct us in either of two directions. We
may be meant to ask: (a) Did he contract his muscles intentionally?
(That is, was contracting his muscles something he did by dint of
which an event is revealed to be an action?) Or, (b) was his
contracting of his muscles an action? Since it will be agreed on all
hands that the answer to (a) is No, we can confine attention to (b).
Moore himself appears to vacillate on the question whether people
contract their muscles-whether sentences like "She contracted such
and such muscles" are quite frequently true. But if people contract
their muscles, then in order to answer (b), we shall have to know
whether and how an event that is someone's contracting of her
muscles can be differently described. Our opinion on this should
be determined by our view of events' individuation, and I thought
that I shared Moore's view of that. If, on the other hand, people do
not contract their muscles, then "her contracting her muscles" is not
true of anything, so that (b) lapses, and there is no dispute.86
If Moore and I can agree about all this (or, when we disagree,
it does not matter), then one wonders what his argument is meant
to achieve. He summarizes it "[s]ince only bodily movements are
these kinds of physical effects [that is, those caused by a willing,
trying, or other mental act], only bodily movements can be basic
actions."8 7 Well, I showed in the text that Moore has one good
reason not to argue that "only bodily movements can be basic
actions": it leads to contradictions 88 as it is at odds with his thesis
8 Cf. supra notes 10, 12 and accompanying text.
Admittedly if people do not contract their muscles, then one of the arguments
I gave for thinking that bodily movements, are not parts of actions also lapses. In
fact, though, I persist in thinking that people contract their muscles; I blame the
unease we feel about saying that they do on the failure of subpersonal and personal
accounts to mesh with one another. See discussion supra part VII. So I actually hold
that there are things a person does that are causally more basic than the teleologically
basic thing she does. But if people do not contract their muscles, my definition of
"an action" and (7) above are unaffected.
87 MOORE, supra note 1, at 104.
" See discussion supra part I.
ACTION AND ABERRATION
about individuation.89 And there is another reason now for Moore
to avoid his conclusion: it goes back on his own "only partial
identity" thesis. Effects of volitions (movements,, which were
supposed to be parts of actions) are being said by him now to be
actions.
S See discussion supra part I.
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